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U.S.  policy  on directed  credit  has a limited  impact  on growth-
partly because  it is oriented  more toward equity than growth.
U.S. credit programs have generally  succeeded  in increasing
credit to, but not necessarily  in increasing  investment  by, the
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the paper are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
contact Maria Raggambi, room N9-033, extension 37664 (November 1992, 30 pages).
Schwarz surveys U.S. experience with directed  The first common empirical  technique examn-
credit as background for a larger study of the  ines credit allocation in the economy. Schwarz
Asian experience. Almost half of net credit lent  finds that for the largest program, housing credit,
in the United States annually is directly affected  the effect of credit program on credit allocation is
by government policies - half of net credit  very small and may be negative when cross-
covering budget deficits, and half falling under  program effects are considered.
various federal credit programs.
The second common empirical technique But the main difference between U.S. and  examines individual sectors. Results here are
Asian credit policy is that U.S. credit policy is  mixed. In agriculture, much of the credit raises
oriented more toward equity than toward growth.  the demand for land, providing a gain for land-
Different sectors are affected differently by U.S.  owners rather than increasing production. In
credit policies.  education, less than a third of the students who
got government credit would not have gone to Few empirical studies test how U.S. credit  college without it. So in both cases, the credit
policies affect growth - perhaps partly because  had a positive impact but at a sizable cost.
of the motives behind those policies. Few
empirical studies even test whether the policies  Schwarz concludes that despite its huge
effectively increase credit to the target group.  volume, directed credit in the United States has a
Schwarz outlines a method for testing the  limited impact on growth. The credit programs
effectiveness of credit policy, then examines  have generally succeeded in increasing credit to
existing empirical work to see how it fits that  the targeted group, but not necessarily in increas-
methodology.  ing investment by that group.
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Concurrent  with  the discussion  of the effectiveness  of directed  credit policies  in the Asian
context,  it is useful  to look at directed credit  policies  in other OECD countries.  Such  studies
help isolate characteristics  of the Asian  economies  which  may  be unique  to the Asian context,  but
are perhaps replicable,  and at the same time bring  up empirical  and conceptual  issues  which
would  need to be resolved  in evaluating  the effectiveness  of directed  credit both in the Asian
context  and in a broader LDC context. This  paper focuses  on the literature regarding  the
effectiveness  of credit policies  in the U.S. One primary  difference  between  credit policy  in the
U.S. and in East Asia is its objective. In the U.S. equity  considerations  have been a major focus
in credit  programs,  while  in East Asia the focus  has been on growth. In the U.S. credit  policy  has
favored  housing,  agriculture,  and small  business. There has been little  support for industrial
investment  either in growing  or declining  industries. Nevertheless,  it is useful  to survey  the U.S.
experience  to determine  whether the credit  policies  have been effective  in achieving  whatever
objective  they were designed  to achieve.
The U.S.  federal government,  despite  the presence  of a highly  developed  financial  system,
maintains  an extensive  involvement  in credit  allocation. Looking  at aggregate  statistics,  over the
1980's,23.6%  of the net credit  lent in U.S. credit  markets  was lent directly  to the federal
government  to cover  its budget  deficit. A further 25.8%  was lent to private entities,  but was
supported  by a federal  credit  program,  although  most of it was housing  oriented and involved  only
a small  subsidy  (see below).' Such  programs  include  direct lending  programs  by federal
1 There may  be a small  amount of double-counting  if in a particular  year the government
borrowing  to cover  its budget  deficit  includes  money  to finance  credit  programs. However,  most
direct loans programs  are financed  as revolving  funds  with disbursements  in a particular  yeargovernment  agencies  (1.4%  of total credit  lent), loans  guaranteed  by the government  (4.5%),
loans  made by government-sponsored  credit  agencies  (9.8%)2,  and loans  to state and local
governments  which  have tax-exempt  status (10.2%). Of the total credit lent to the private  sector,
33.8%  fell under the aegis  of a federal  program. But federal government  involvement  in credit
allocation  does not end here.  The tax deductibility  of certain  credit activities  like residential
mortgages  and investment  tax credits  offered for particular  investment  activities  clearly  influences
the amount  of credit  demanded  and thus allocated  by the market  to these activities. This paper
will  focus  on the effects  of specific  credit programs,  ignoring  the impact  of the tax code and other
government  regulations.
In some  respects,  these aggregate  numbers  of government  involvement  exaggerate
government  impact  on credit allocation. To measure impact,  one has to look at the difference  in
credit allocation  before and after government  programs  have been implemented.  This kind of
infbrmation  is not available  since  the programs  have been in place for a long time and major
structural  shifts  have occurred  in the U.S.  economy  during  that time. The impact  of government
credit  programs  on credit  allocation  then has to be measured  by some  alternative  means.
Credit which  is heavily  subsidized  generally  changes  the allocation  of credit in that entities
with  a low  demand  for credit  at market  prices will  have a much  higher demand  for credit  at
subsidized  prices unless  credit  demand  is inelastic. In addition,  in the absence  of credit programs,
funded by repayments  on past loans. The loan guarantees  also do not generally  affect  the budget
unless  defaults  exceed  the loan guarantee  fees paid by borrowers. Government-sponsored
enterprises  raise credit  directly  through  private credit  markets  and not through the budget. The
tax-exempt  status  of state and local  borrowing  represents  an opportunity  cost in terms of revenue
to the budget,  but does not cause a direct  budgetary  outlay.
2 Most  of the loans  by the govermment  sponsored  enterprises  are to financial  institutions.
Loans  to financial  institutions  are generally  not included  in the figures  for overall  credit, which
measure  the credit  to final  borrowers,  not to intermediating  institutions. However,  these loans
are intended  to increase  lending  to particular  groups  of final borrowers  and are customarily
included  in a measure  of government  involvement  in credit markets.
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some  entities  will  be credit  rationed at market  prices. The program  may  not carry  an explicit
subsidy,  but may  make credit  available  to entities  which  would  ordinarily  have been rationed. This
type of program  carries  an implicit  subsidy  in that the market  would  have been willing  to make
credit available  to the rationed  entity at some  price above  market due to higher risks. By making
credit  available  at market  prices, the previously  rationed  entity  is being subsidized.  Therefore,  the
degree of explicit  subsidy  does not completely  measure  the impact  of a program  on credit
alloration,  but heavily  subsidized  programs  would  generally  have a greater impact  than non-
subsidized  programs,  assuming  similar  elasticities  for credit  demand.
The degree  of explicit  subsidy  varies  considerably  across  programs. Over half of the loans
guaranteed  by the Federal government  are processed  through  the Federal  Housing  Administration
where  the degree of subsidy  is low,  amounting  to 1.2%  of the value  of the loan. Less than 25%
of the direct lending  and loan guarantee  programs  carry  subsidies  greater than 10%  of the value
of the loan. The bulk of the lending  by the government-sponsored  enterprises,  94%, is also
housing  related. The degree  of subsidy  here is difficult  to estimate,  but the co-existence  of
private credist  enterprises  which  deal in secondary  market  mortgage  transactions  suggests  a low
subsidy  level. Thus, while  the breadth of U.S.  government  involvement  in credit  markets is
immense,  the depth of involvement  in micro  credit allocation  appears  far more limited.
The paper is organized  as follows. Section  2 contains  brief descriptions  of the major
federal credit programs  in existence  in 1989  with some  statistics  regarding  magnitude  aid degree
of subsidy. Section  3 discusses  methodological  issues  in an analysis  of the effectiveness  of credit
programs. Section  4 discusses  the existing  empirical  work,  and Section  5 concludes.4
I.  Descrf  n of federal  credit programs
There exist  a variety  of types  of federal  credit  programs  with different  implications  for
credit allocation  and the federal budget. The first type is the direct loan  program. Under  direct
loans,  a federal government  agency  makes  the loan to the borrower  with no financial  intermediary
involvement.  The loans are usually  operated as a revolving  fund, so that funds received  as
repayments  of previous  loans  are used for making  new  loans. However,  should  the repayments
fall short of new lending  requirements,  money  will  have to be appropriated  from the budget.
Some  of the direct  loans  are also involuntary  in that guaranteed  loans  which  have defaulted  often
become  direct loans. Over  time, the ratio of direct  lending  to guaranteed  lending  has fallen
considerably,  from about 1/3  in the 1950's  to 15%  in 1989.
Table I provides  statistics  on the major  direct loans  programs  in existence  in 1989. The
individual  programs  listed in Table 1 comprise  98% of the overall  direct loan obligations  assumed
by the government  in 1989. However,  as a percentage  of the total outstanding  loans,  they
comprise  only 75%,  pointing  out the changes  in the relative  importance  of the different  programs
historically.  The largest  direct loan programs  not currently  accumulating  significant  new  loan
obligations  include  several  loan funds  directed  by the Agency  for International  Development
(AID), education  programs  which  have shifted  toward loan  guarantees  rather than direct  lending,
the Economic  Support  Fund of the President,  and several  housing  related  programs.
From Table 1, it is apparent that level of subsidy  varies  greatly,  from 5% of the value of
the loan for Tennessee  Valley  Authority  loans  to 70% for P.L. 480  loans. Little information
exists  on the volume  of write-offs  as can be seen from Table 1. What information  does exist
suggests  that government  agencies  are reluctant  to write-off  loans,  making  the repayment  rates
much worse  than indicated.S
TABLE 1
MAJOR DIRECT LOAN  PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,  1989  Millons  of  $
Program  Descriptfoll  New  Loans  % Subidy  Subsidy  cost  oand  %  wrieffs  L_sses
Commodity Credit  Short  tem loans  to  10,746  13,695  76.7 C.orporationS  prou"  of agLaIbIa  (54%)  (7%)  0.6% ______________  commodities_ 
_  _  ___  _  _  _
Foreign Military  Pmement  Of  U.S.  4,460  20,821 Sales 4 mtiy  qpip  m1 by  (22%)  (10%) forign  govenmmes
Veterans'  Purchasing  of VA forclosed  977  156.3  1,629 Administration  hones  by creditwory  (5%)  16.0%  (1%) indivduals
Farmers'  Home  Purchasing  and opeating  900  74.7  52,122  677.6 Administration  farms,  dia  assisane,  (4%)  8.3%  (25%)  1.3% pmaving  mural  hosing,
etc.
Export-Import  Provids direct  loans  to  705  81.8  8,274 Bank  finane U.S. expoters  (4%)  11.6%  (4%)  .
P.L. 480 Long  term  Meeting  needs of developing  739  517.3  12,261 export credits  nations  trugh  sale  of  (4%)  70.0%  (6%) _  agiutual  commodities  I  I  _
3 The exact amount of subsidy  in any given year depends on the difference between market prices and the support price guaranteed to the farmer.
4 All of these loans are being forgiven. The repayment record on these loans was so miserable  that they have been converted into grants.6
MAJOR DIRECT LOAN PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,  1989  Milions  of $
Program  Description  New  Loam  % Subsidy  Subsidy  cost  Outstandig  % write-offs  Losses
loans
Housing and Urban  Housing  for the  elderly  or  350  73.0  7,560
Development  hwidicapped  (2%)  21.7%  (4%)  l
Small Business  Small  businesses  and  t  265  37.6  5,822  494.9
Administration  who  s(ffer  bs1  from  1%)  14.2%  (3%)  8.5% physical  disasters
Tennessee  Valley  Provides  finacing for  250  12.5  2,150
Authority  resoure development  in the  (1%)  5.0%  (1%) Tennessee  Vally area
Rural  Provides  financing  for numl  177  26.9  33,452
Electrification  electricity  and telephone  (1 %)  15.2%  (16%)
Administration 
_yst_m__l
TOTAL All Federal  20,005  884.7  207,402  1,760
Programs'  (100%)  22.5%  _  (100%)  0.8%  l
SOURCESpecial  Analysis  F," in S§mcial  Analvses: Budget  of the United  States  Goverment. Fiscal  Year 1989,  Executive  Office  of the President,  Office  of Management  and
Budget  (washington: U.S. Govemnment  Printing  Office, 1988),  pp. F-64-78.
5 The average subsidy  is calculated only for the programs where the subsidy  amount is available.7
It is also important  to determine  some  government  objective  for each Ivan  program  by
which  the program  results can be measured. Almost  90% of the direct loan obligations  are
intended  to support American  business,  with the lion's share  going  to agribusiness  and rnral
infrastructure. However,  it must be emph--ized  that although  these loans  support American
business,  they are not designed  to generate higher  growth  as the Japanese system  of directed
credit is alleged  to do. These business-supporting  programs  include  all those listed in Table 1
except  the loans  from the Veterans' Administration  (VA) and Housing  and Urban  Development
(HUD). The three agricultural  related  loan agencies,  Commodity  Credit Corporation  (CCC),
Farmers'  Home Administration,  and the Rural Electrification  Administration,  may  have some
limited  objective  of increasing  equity. However,  the primary  recipients  of price supports  from the
CCC and the beneficiaries  of the other rural programs  are not generally  the rural poor.  Similarly,
the Small  Business  Admiristration  (SBA)  provides  loans  for small  businesses  for equity  reasons,
but also  to correct some  perceived  imperfection  in the capital  markets  (the bias against  lending  to
small  firms). The remaining  loan agencies  often have less  business-related  objectives. The HUD
program  provides  housing  for the elderly  or the handicapped  and can be considered  purely  equity
enhancing. The VA loans  are a mixture  of equity  enhancing  and business  support. Initially  the
VA loans were meant to boost the housing  market,  and the adjustment  of VA interest rates to
stimulate  the economy  suggests  that they provide  support  to the construction  industry. However,
there is also some  concern  toward  equity  in that there are limits  to the purchase  price of a home
financed  by the VA.
Table 2 shows  similar  statistics  for the seconu  .ype of government  credit  program,  the
guaranteed  loan. Under this type of program,  the government  agrees to pay the principal  and
sometimes  the interest on all or part of the loan if the borrower  defaults. Generally,  the
government  also collects  some fee which  partially  pays  for the insurance. Unlike  direct  loan8
TABLE  2
MAJOR GUARANTEED  LOAN PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,  1989 iltliorls  of  $  _  I
Program  Description  Coimitments  X  Subsidy  Subsidy  Outstanding  X loan  Losses cost  commitments  termination
Federal  Housing  Help  families  become  61,790  1.2%  741  290,729  1.9%  5,524 Administration  homeowners  (54%)  (53%)
Veterans'  Mortgage  guarantees  17,940  6.6%  1,184  149,957  1.7%  2,489 Administration  for  veteramn  with  no  (16%)  (28%)
Export-Import  Guarantees  to  10,200  2.5%  255  5,023 Bank  facilitate  U.S.  ( 9%)  (  1% exports
Guaranteed  Guarantees  of  10,039  33.6%  3,373  42,306  4.4%  1,861 Student  Loans  education  loans  to  9%)  8%) undergraduate  ar  i  9%
graduate  students  _  _
Farmers'  Home  Guarantees  Loans  for  3,600  0.8%  29  5,806  4.7%  275 Administration  rura  housirg  and  (  3%)  (  1%)
Small  Business  Credit  assistance  to  3,596  9.1%  327  10,037  5.6%  559 Administration  small  businesses  (  3%)  (  2%)  _
Commodity  Credit  Loan  guarantees  for  3,500  13.7%  480  7,846  10.7%  837 Corporationexport  sales  which(  3%1
Corporationb  might  not  occur
otherwise  _
Foreign  Military  Procurement  of  U.S.  2,300  7.5%  173  7,553 Sales  mfltftay  ewipiient  (2%)(1) and  services
disasters
Rural  Guarantees  of  private  1,319  17.3%  228  3,583 Electrification  loans  for  power  (  1%) Administrat!ion  gereration
TOTAL  All  115,306  7.6%  8,742.8  544,837  2.0%  10,876 programs  (100%)  I  (100%)  I
SOURCE:  "Special  Analysis  F,"  Speciat  Analvses:  Budqet  of  the  United  States  Government,  Executive  Office  of  the  President,  Office  of ganagement and  Bucget  (Washington:  U.S.  Govermnent  Printing  Ottice,  ¶98),  pp.  F-79-B7.9
programs,  these programs  entail no budgetary  cost  to the government  at the time the commitment
is made. However,  they  do increase  the contingent  liability  of the government.  The individual
gLarantee  programs  listed  in Table  2 include  99.1%  of the commitments  incurred  in 1989  and
96% of the outstanding  loans  as of 1989. The only sizable  program  in terms of outstanding
commitments  not included  is a program  for low  rent public  housing  administered  by the
Department  of Housing  and Urban Development.  The overall  level  of subsidy  is relatively  low,
but as with the direct  loan programs,  the deree  of subsidy  varies  considerably,  from .8% of the
value  of the loan  for loans  from the Farmers'  Home Administration  to 33.6%  for student loan
programs. The termination  rates for these loans  are also low,  but are primarily  due to the low
termination  rates on housing  loans.
Unlike  the direct loan programs,  many  of these prograsnt  have mixed  objectives. The
guarantees  from the Export-Import  Bank,  the Farmers'  Home Administration,  the Commodity
Credit Corporation,  Foreign  Military  sales,  the Rural Electrification  Administration,  and the Small
Business  Administration  are generally  to enhance  business. The housing  loan guarantees  contain
both equity  and business  objectives.  The SBA loar guarantees  are both equity  and business-
oriented. The student  loan guarantees,  however,  are generally  equity-oriented.
The third type of support the governmen  provides  to credit mLikets  is through
government-sponsored  credit  agencies. These agencies  sometimes  function  simply  as financial
intermediaries,  buying  loans,  such as mortgages,  from primary  originators,  and then issuing
mortgage-backed  securities  to investors. By thus creating  a secondary  market for long term debt
such as mortgages,  the government  makes  mortgages  less risky  for the original  lender, encouraging
more capital  to flow  into the preferred  sector. Sometimes  the credit  agencies  actually  hold the
primary  loans in their own  portfolios  for investment  purposes. In neither case,  do the activities  of
these government-sponsored  credit  agencies  affect the goverment  budget. The agencies  are10
responsible  for raising  their own  funds. However,  their debt does enjoy  benefits  such as equal
standing  with  Treasury  debt for bank investments,  enabling  these credit  agencies  to borrow  in
credit markets  at rates only slightly  above  Treasury  rates. Table  3 contains  statistics  for the
government-sponsored  credit agencies. No comparable  data on subsidies  are available  since  the
subsidy  occurs  in the below  market  funding  of the credit  agency  and not on a per loan basis. The
primary  programs  here are housing  oriented,  with  smaller  programs  for agriculture  and student
loans. The outstanding  loans  from the Student  Loan Marketing  Association  have  been
converted  into direct  loans  and are thus included  within  that category  in Table 1.
TABLE  3
LENDING BY MAJOR  GOVERNMENT-SPONSOREBD
ENTERPRISES,  1989  NlLionts  of  $
ENTERPRISE  NEW LOANS  OUTSTANDING LOANS
Federtl  Home Loan  260,000  143,856
Banks  (57%)  (19%)
Federal Home Loan  77,499  318,377
Mortgage Corporation  (17%)  (42%)
Federal National  54,857  252,067
Mortgage Assocation  (12%)  (33%)
Farm Credit Banks 7 55,262  48,225
____________  ____________(12%)  (  6%)
Student Loaf Marketing  6,365  0
Association  (  1%)  (  0%)
l  TOTAL  453,983  761,706
._,_____(___________  _(100%)  (100%)
SOURCE:  "special  Analysis  F,"  in  SIeft  Ana  Dles*  udaet  of  th U  rted  Steteo
Government.  Fis  ao  Year  WY,  Execut0v  ceo  to  resent  Officeof
nwagement  and  sucget  (wasngton: U.S.  Goverment  Printing  Office,  198).
6The Federal  Home Loan Bank  System  makes a large  number  of short terms loans  to its
member  institutions,  resulting  in the new loan figure  being larger  than the outstanding  loan figure.
7 See note 6 for the Federal Home Loan Bank  System.
The outstanding  loans  of the Student  Loan Marketing  Association  have been converted  into
direct loans and are included  uuder that category.11
The last type of government  involvement  in credit  markets  comes  through  the issuance  of
tax-exempt  securities. The federal government  has allowed  securities  issued  by state and local
governments  to have  tax-exempt  status. The money  raised  from such issues  has frequently  been
used for private purposes  de ignated by the state and local govermments.  Due to the tax-exempt
status,  the securities  carry  a lower  interest rate. The subsidy  element is the difference  between
the market interest rate and the cost of raising  these tax-exempt  funds. Table 4 shows  the
distribution  by purpose of the tax-exempt  securities  issued  in 1989. Unfortunately,  the total
outstanding  issues  are not available  by sector, only in aggregate. In 1989,  this total stood at
$1046.2  billion,  about 10%  of the credit  market debt owed  by nonfinancial  sectors.
TABLE 4
TAX EXEMPT SECURITIES ISSUED IN 1989  Billions of $
Purpose  New Issues
Public  organizations  77.0
(74%)
Private nonprofit  organization  14.0
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~(13%  )
Industrial  development  bonds  5.8
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  6 % )
Housing  bonds  4.5
(4%)
Student loans  1.8
(2%)
Pollution control  1.2
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (~~1%  )
TOTAL  104.4
.___________________________  (100%)
SOURCE:  'Special Analysis  F," in Soecial  Analyses: Budget  of the United  States  Govemnment  Fiscal Year 1989,
Exeuive  Office  of the Pesident, Office  of Management  and Budget  (Washingtun: U.S.
Govement  Printing  Offcec,  1988).12
m. Methodological  Issues
Section  U describes  the magnitude  of government  involvement  in credit allocation  by
sector. What is surprising  is that the literature  on the effectiveness  of this directed  credit for the
U.S. is largely  either theoretical  or descriptive. The empirical  work  suffers  from the inability  of
economists  to determine  the marginal  increase  in borrowing  due to credit  policy. While  the
overall  level  of borrowing  is available,  as is the level  of borrowing  under each type of credit
program,  most economists  believe  that many  of the loans  would  have been made without  the
lending  program,  resulting  in a subsidy  to the targeted sector rather than in a change  in the
allocation  of credit. The problems  cited with  attempts  to measure  the changes  in creou allocation
include  the long duration of the programs  and the substantive  changes  in the nature of the
programs  in the course of their existence. The duration of the programs  becomes  a problem  due
to structural  changes  in the economy,  e.g.,  demand  for farm  credit  has been affected  by the
decline  in the importance  of the U.S. agricultural  sector. Some  empirical  literature does exist,
and its results  with notes on methodology  wIll  be discussed  below.
The lack  of firm  evidence  on the allocative  effects  of credit  policy  is particularly
troublesome  given  the mechanisms  through  which  directed  credit  leads to growth. 9 First, we
would  expect  that directed credit  would  lead to increased  borrowing  in the targeted sector. This
first step is crucial  to the effectiveness  of directed  credit,  regardless  of whether  the ultimate  goal
is growth,  equity,  or some  other objective. Second,  the increased  borrowing  must lead to
increased  investment  in the targeted  sector. If the amount  borrowed  is used to fund land
speculation  or consumption,  then the directed  credit  policy  will  not be successful  in promoting
The objective  of some credit  programs  is not promoting  growth,  but smoothing  decline. As
Reich notes, several  Japanese and German  programs  are designed  to ease resources  out of an
industry. Other objectives  may  be oriented  toward  equity. Robert B. Reich, "Making  Industrial
Policy,"EQrMign  Affaki (60), Spring  1982,  pp. 852-81.13
growth.  Some degree of monitoring by the government may be necessary to make sure that the
funds are used for their intended purposes, but even sufficient monitoring does not guarantee an
increase in investment. If the investment would have taken place without the credit policy, then
the credit policy merely frees up funds to be used for some other purpose, i.e.,the  funds are
fungible.  Third, the increased investment must be productive and increase output in the targeted
sector.  For investment to be productive, the project must be cost-efficient, and credit constraints
must be binding.  If credit previously has not been a constraint on output, then increasing or
subsidizing  credit will not increase aggregate output.  And finally, growth in the targeted sector
must lead to overall growth throughout the economy. Generally, credit to the targeted sector is
allocated away from other sectors.  This reallocation can be justified on two grounds:  (1) credit
market imperfections which prevent an equilibrium allocation from reaching the targeted sector
and (2) positive externalities generated by the targeted sector.
If the first condition above is not satisfied, namely that borrowing in the targeted sector
does not increase, as many economists claim, then directed credit merely subsidizes  the targeted
sector.  This subsidy may still be effective in producing growth if some previous noncredit
distortion had limited output in the targeted sector.  The credit policy may thus be regarded as a
second best policy. However, even if it is determined that a subsidy  is justifiable to a particular
sector on economic efficiency  grounds, we would still have to determine whether a credit subsidy
with its subsequent distortions of financial markets is the second best policy or third or fourth best
policy.'°
"0 One argument presented by Reich is that emerging industries represent riskier investments
and thus receive less credit from capital markets.  He argues that the U.S. government already
subsidizes some new industries by its own massive  investments in the deferse  and space programs.
A credit program may be more neutral in that all emerging industries would be equally subsidized.14
A related issue concerns the overall level of borrowing. Directed credit policies may
either reallocate existing credit from general market borrowing to target groups or actually
increase the level of credit in the market.  If the credit policy reailocates existing credit, the policy
is welfare-enhancing only if the target group generates large positive externalities, larger than the
non-targeted groups, for the economy. If the actual level of borrowing increases, the policy is
more likely to be welfare-enhancing. 'The debate centers on the supply elasticity of funds.  If
funds are inelastically  supplied, credit policy which targets credit toward one group systematically
reduces credit availability  for other groups.  If the funds have a positive supply elasticity, then the
aggregate level of borrowing will rise when a govermment  program increases the demand for
credit.  Estimates from the literature on the supply elasticity of savings with respect to interest
range from 0 to 5.i"  Of the 11 studies cited by DeFina, 9 show the supply of savings to be
relatively or completely inelastic to interest rates, suggesting that directed credit generally
reallocates existing credit.' 2
No empirical work looks at the transmission  of directed credit to growth as outlined
above.  Instead what studies do exist generally use an elasticity  of demand for a particular type of
expenditure with respect to cost from the literature.  They then calculate subsidy elements in the
federal credit programs and determine the extent to which the credit subsidy  reduces the cost of
the expenditure.  These figures are then combined to determine the increase in demand for the
"Robert  H. DeFina, "The Link Between Savings  and Interest Rates:  A Key Element in the
Tax Policy Debate,"  Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
November/December 1984, p.19.
32 However, these studies have largely been generated to measure the response of domestic
savings to fiscal policy changes which have interest rate effects.  The supply of credit available to
borrowers, however, includes foreign savings as well as domestic savings. The supply elasticity
should generally be expected to be higher than for strictly domestic savings. The bulk of credit,
nevertheless, continues to be generated domestically. In 1989, only 12.1  % of the total credit
outstanding was funded from abroad.15
credit activity  predicted from the calculated subsidy  levels. These calculations provide the first
step in the transmission of directed credit into growth.  The two most comprehensive studies,
Gale (1991)'3 and Bosworth, Carron, and Rhyne (1987),"4  both arrive at their estimates of the
effectiveness of directed credit in this manner.  While these estimates are extremely useful, before
applying their results to evaluating directed credit programs, several points need to be considered.
First, each of these studies bases the estimates on previously determined demand
elasticities. These previously determined elasticities are based on small changes in the cost of the
activity. The removal or addition of government programs in all but the mortgage sector involves
a fairly large interest rate change.  With such a large structural change, ;he elasticities of demand
may not remain constant.  This is particularly important since these elasticities are generally taken
from a single study at a single point in time and thus represent reasonable, but not necessarily
robust, estimates.' 5 Given that the government programs usually involve a number of restrictions
on type of recipients and use of funds, it is also likely that the credit demand elasticity related to
a government program is less than that for an unrestricted change in cost.  This is a particularly
important issue for certain programs, such as education, where the elasticity used covers a change
in the cost of education, not a change in the cost of education credit.  Since not all education
expenditure is financed through the credit market, the demand elasticity with respect to a
particular type of cost would be less than for unrestricted cost changes.
Second, in many cases government intervention has included setting up financial
institutions, the government-sponsored enterprises, to deal with ma,ket  failure.  Market failure, in
" William G. Gale, "Economic  Effects of Federal Credit Programs,"  American Economic
Review 81 (1), March 1991,  pp. 133-52.
t4Barry P. Bosworth, Andrew S. Carron, and Elisabeth H. Rhyne, The Economics of Federal
Credit Programs (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution, 1987).
1  Gale reports that the results were not affected much by using different demand elasticities.16
this case, occurs when individual  banks cannot sell loans they have made to secondary markets,
thus burdening themselves with long term loans financed by shorter term deposits.  The secondary
market fails to exist because the value of the loans is difficult to assess. The government-
sponsored enterprises provided this secondary market, guaranteeing the loans and standardizing
the contracts.  As individuals  have gained experience and information in loan purchasing, in some
cases, private brokers have emerged, suggesting that the government enterprises played a key role
in generating the information critical to the functioning of these secondary markets.  The value of
these institutions affects the supply of funds, not the demand for credit and cannot be captured in
a loan demand elasticity.  In addition, the value of these institutions has changed over time.  As
noted by Bosworth et al., private mortgage insurance and secondary markets which improve
market efficiency  now exist in the housing market, lessening the importance of the government-
sponsored enterprises, but have not developed in the student loan market.  Furthermore, the rate
of institutional development may itself be endogenous as a substantial government subsidy
precludes the development of private competitors.  As a result, the estimates provided by Gale
and Bosworth tend to understate the value of government credit programs overall.
A third point, addressed by Gale, but not by Bosworth et al., relates to the overall impact
of credit policies. The U.S. has developed separate credit programs for particular sectors rather
than an overall credit strategy.  As a result, each program attracts credit to its targeted group and
away from all others.  Multiple programs result in reducing the effectiveness of each individual
program.  Gale calculates that anywhere from 2.5-175  %  " of a program's effectiveness is offset
by other programs, depending on the program and assumptions about credit supply elasticities.
" This implies that in some cases the borrower would in fact be better off if all subsidy
programs were eliminated.17
Fourth, even if the results  of these studies  show  that credit  demand in a particular  sector
did not grow,  it does not imply  that the policy  itself  is ineffective  due to the degree  of
aggregation.  The targeted group for a housing  credit  policy,  for example,  may  be a group of low
income  individuals.  If the cred,t policy  effectively  grants  loans  to the targeted group at the
expense  of higher income  individuals  demanding  housing  loans,  then equity  has been enhanced
even if the total number  of loans  to the housing  sector has not increased. The intra-sectoral
allocation  of funds  has been affected  by the credit  policy. The studies  only  measure intersectoral
allocation  changes.
Fifth,  estimates  of credit  demand  based  on the subsidy  element in credit  programs  do not
indicate  whether  the increased  credit  has in fact led to increased  output. Some  studies  suggest
that agricultural  credit may  have increased  land  prices. Similarly,  student loans  may  have
increased  tuition costs. The credit may  have  been effective  in reaching  the target sector,  but may
then have been inefficiently  used. The credit subsidy  in these cases  simply  transfers  income  to
existing  landowners  or to schools. In the case  of education,  the government  would  effectively  be
subsidizing  private institutions  of higher  education. The value of this subsidy  given  the existence
of public  institutions  is debatable. A somewhat  related  point discussed  by Bosworth  is that some
of any subsidy  will  go to the lender assuming  that the supply  of funds  is not perfectly  elastic. The
subsidy  going  to the lender will  have no impact  on output in the targeted sector.
Finally,  the premise  of many  of these targeted credit  programs  is that investment  in the
targeted sectors leads  to higher growth  in the economy. One rationale  for student loans
programs,  for example,  is the positive  social  externalities  generated  by an educated  population.
This ability  of targeted credit to generate growth  cannot be measured  by the calculations
discussed  above. As such,  the empirical  work  can provide  an estimate  of how  much additional
credit is going  to the targeted groups,  but not of whether  the directed  credit increases  growth.18
Furthermore, as noted in Section II, the explicit goal of many U.S. programs has been equity
rather than growth.  Indirectly, equity may lead to growth or may in fact stymie growth.
IV. Empirical Evidence
Only one article, Gale (1991), addresses overall credit policy in the U.S.  Gale's analysis
uses simulation techniques to determine the effects of U.S. credit policies on the percentage of
credit allocated to each sector of the economy. He takes parameters for supply elasticities,
demand elasticities, and repayment rates from the literature, but has to provide two sets of
estimates based on the extreme values of the supply elasticities of funds found in the literature,
one using a supply elasticity of .5,the othe using an elasticity of 5.  He finds that credit policies
would be effective in increasing the allocation of funds to target groups except in one case.  The
model assumes that the government must borrow funds to finance the credit program.  If the
supply of funds is inelastic, interest rates rise when the government borrows.  The resulting
interest rate rise may offset the credit  subsidy if the subsidy is small, as is the case for housing
mortgages. However, in all cases, the targeted groups have benefitted at the expense of general
nontargeted borrowers.  Overall lending to nongovernment has increased when supply elasticities
are high, but has decreased when supply elasticities are low.  Gale also finds that since each
individual  program allocates credit toward a particular set of borrowers and away from all other
borrowers, the co-existence of multiple programs counteracts each program's effectiveness in
directing credit.  This is particularly important since the bulk of the literatura looks at credit
policy directed toward a particular target.
The remaining literature focuses on particular sectors in the U.S. economy, generally
housing, agriculture, education, small business,  tax-exempt state and local projects, or export19
financing.  These sectors  cover  over 90% of U.S. credit  programs. Unlike  the Japanese  programs,
industrial  strategic  sectors  are not identified  or targeted under U.S. programs." 7
Housing
Sixty  percent of federal credit  activity  takes place  in the housing  market and over fifty
percent of housing  mortgages  are supported  by government  programs. The programs  include  the
Federal Housing  Authority  (FHA) loans,  Veterans'  Administration  (VA) loans,  and secondary
market activities  through  government  sponsored  agencies  like the Federal National  Mortgage
Association  (Fannie  Mae), the Federal Home  Loan Mortgage  Corporation  (Freddie Mac),  and
the Government  National  Mortgage  Association  (Ginnie  Mae). Gale's calculations  of the subsidy
involved  in the mortgage  market include  the cost of loan insurance  not passed  on to the borrower
and amount  to a .2% reduction  in the interest rate.  His simulation  study  using an interest
elasticity  of 1.8 for mortgage  loan demand 1 @ concludes  that the increase  in borrowing  from the
federal credit  programs  has been extremely  limited. Bosworth  comes  to the same conciusion.
Due to the limited  subsidy  involved,  the effects  on resource  allocation  are limited. However,  as
Bosworth  notes,  one major impact  of the federal agency  activity  has been an increase  in the
liquidity  of the mortgage  loans,  leading  to an integration  between  the mortgage  market and other
capital  markets. Presuming  that some  market imperfections  had prevented  this integration
previously,  we could  conclude  that correcting  these imperfections  by instituting  secondary  markets,
for example,  would  increase  the supply  of funds  to the mortgage  market and thus increase  the
1tThere  have been limited  attempts at strategic  targeting  toward  the synthetic  fuels industry
and at large corporations  like Chrysler  which  required  bailouts.
*The  loan elasticity  used comes  from a single  study  by Dhrymes  and Taubman  (1969)  which
looks at the total new mortgages  granted  per SMSA  between 1964  and 1966  as a function  of the
effective  interest rate (including  loan fees) and other variables.20
allocation  of credit  to this market. However,  this aspect  of housing  credit,  as noted earlier,  is
difficult  to measure  and has thus been ignored. The segmentation  of the mortgage  market itself
is a debatable  issue. Bosworth  attempts  to reconcile  the conflicting  evidence  and concludes  that
in the short run (less  than a year),  the market is indeed  segmented,  but in the long run, mortgage
markets are integrated  with  other capital  markets. The value of the government  provided
secondary  market activities  falls  when the market is in fact integrated  and these activities  could  be
provided  by the private sector.
Agriculture
T-he  second  sector with  heavy  government  involvement  is the agricultural  sector. The
rationale  for goverment involvement  in the agricultural  sector is to provide  credit to farmers  at
rates comparable  to those for other sectors  of the economy. The concern initially  was that many
of the rural markets  were small  and not integrated  with national  markets,  raising  the cost of credit
to farmers. In fact, farm  credit  today is generally  allocated  at more generous  terms than credit  in
the non farming  sector. There are 3 major components  of agricultut  lit policy: (1) the Farm
Credit  System,  (2) the Farmers'  Home Administration,  and (3) the Rural Electrification
Administration.  The Farm  Credit System  did provide  for the special  credit needs  of farmers  when
these were not being  addressed  by national  credit  markets,  but may  be redundant  today given  the
prevalence  of national  credit markets. The system  also faces  the drawback  of not beikg able to
insure  against  industry  risk  since its assets  are limited  by law  to the agricultural  sector. The
Farmers' Home Administration  is directed  toward more marginal  borrowers  and is heavily
subsidized.  The rural housing  programs  have tended to be effective  in generating  loans simply
because they are more heavily  subsidized.  The emergency  loan programs,  however,  have resulted
in a large increase  in credit  supply  to large  commercial  farms. The Rural Electrification21
Administration  programs  have become  heavily  subsidized  because  the loans are made at rates
fixed  by Congress,  irrespective  of market interest rates. These programs  have  led to both more
capital-intensive  methods  of production  and to lower  utility  rates.
The empirical  results on the effectiveness  of agricultural  credit  are mixed. Gale's analysis
shows  a sizable  increase  in the share  of credit  going  to the farm  sector due to agricultural  credit
policies,  in the order of 50% or more. Gale uses  the elasticity  estimates  from a study  by LeBlanc
and Hrubovcak  (1986)'9  which  shows  that a 1  percentage  point reduction  in the interest rate
increases  the demand  for agricultural  equipment  and structures  about 1 percent and the demand
for land nearly  2 percent. The implications  are that loan subsidies  primarily  are an income
transfer  to current landowners. Gale estimates  that the interest rates charged  farmers  are about 4
percentage  points below  what they would  be in the absence  of subsidies.  The LeBlanc  and
Hrubovcak  study  suggests  that the additional  agricultural  credit may  not have been that effective
in generating  output growth. An increase  in demand  for an inelastically  supplied  factor does not
change  resource  allocation. However,  other evidence  supplied  by Calomiris,  Hubbard,  and Stock
(1986)2  indicates  that farm  output is affected  positively  by the value  of farm  real estate and
negatively  by the projected  debt service  burden  and number  of bank failures. Each of these
variables  represents  a credit constraint. As collateral  values  rise, farmers  can borrow  more, raising
output. As debt service  burdens and bank failures  rise, credit to farmers  becomes  constrained,
constraining  output. Thus,  the Calomiris,  Hubbard  and Stock  paper suggests  a stronger  link
between credit and output than found by LeBlanc  and Hrubovcak.
I9Michael  LeBlanc  and James  Hrubovcak,  "The  Effects  of Tax Policy  on Aggregate
Agricultural  Investment," American  Journal  of Agricultural  Economics,  68, November  1986,  pp.
767-77.
"Charles W. Calomiris,  R. Glenn Hubbard  and James H. Stock, "Growing  in Debt: The
'Farm Crisis'and Public  Policy,"Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity.  1986  (2), pp. 441-79.22
Education
The student loan program, the third of the government credit programs, also initially
addressed perceived market imperfections. Since a student's future income cannot be repossessed
and sold by a lender, students frequently have no collateral. The future return from education,
even if the student's future income could be attached, is risky. The loans are small and have a
high potential of default since students are highly mobile with no credit history.  Other goals of
the programs include promoting education with its positive effects on society and improving  equity
by providing opportunities for low income students.
The empirical work again provides mixed results.  Gale computes a more than doubling of
the share of credit going to students.  The elasticity he uses comes from Bosworth's study.
Bosworth cites a Manski-Wise study which shows that a 1 percent net drop in education costs
would increase enrollment rates by .1 to  .3 percentage points, resulting in an elasticity of between
.1 and .3. McPherson (1978)21  cites 9 studies which show increases in enrollment rates ranging
from .05 to  1.46. Since the costs of education to the student have fallen due to the availability  of
subsidized  student loans,  Bosworth calculates that anywhere from .3 to  1.4 million more students
were enrolled in higher education in 1984  than would have been enrolled without a subsidized
program.  The higher of the two numbers comes from using the higher of the two enrollment
changes in the Manski-Wise  study and assuming that none of the loans would have been available
through the private sector.  Since 3.3 million students received loans in 1984, less than a third of
the loans actually increased borrowing in the best of all possible scenarios, the assumptions of
which are unlikely.  Another study cited by McPherson which uses time series data rather than
2 "Michael S. McPherson, "The Demand for Higher Education," in Public Policy and Private
Higher Education, edited by David W. Breneman and Chester E. Finn, Jr. (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 143-96.23
cross section finds that a 1 percent drop in tuition costs only induces a .1 percentage point
increase in enrollment.  Bosworth also regresses enrollment rates from 1962-84  on the armed
forces draft, net education cost, per capita disposable income, and a time trend and finds that the
time trend and the draft explain most of the changes in enrollment, and the cost of education
basically  does not matter.  Furthermore, critics of the student loan program charge that the two
main effects from the programs are:  (1) an increase in the number of students declaring financial
independence and (2) an increase in the number of low-income students attending private
colleges. The value of either of these effects is debatable.
Business
The federal government is directly involved in less than 5% of nonagricultural business
financing, the fourth major federal credit activity. The original business financing organization,
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, lent largely to medium-sized  firms for manufacturing
and to depressed areas of the country. This organization closed in 1953,  but reopened as the
Small Business Administration. Its objective is to lend only to borrowers who do not meet
commercial bank standards.  The rationale for the program is twofold: (1) due to the huge fixed
cost involved, financing through bond and equity markets is prohibitive for small businesses
forcing them to use bank loans which are shorter term and require collateral and (2) small
businesses provide economic and social benefits in terms of growth and employment.  As private
markets have develop, ',  the SBA has increased its level of subsidy,  effectively eliminating private
competition.  Empirical studies on the effectiveness of the SBA programs generally conclude that
they are ineffective in increasing the flow of credit to the small firm sector, but have instead
replaced private credit to the sector or funded non-creditworthy projects.  One study looks at the
sectoral composition and employment growth of SBA funded companies vs. privately funded24
companies.  If some  industries  are inherently  riskier  than others and could not be funded
privately,  SBA  funded businesses  would  generally  be located  in different  industries  than privately
funded  small  businesses.  However,  the distribution  of SBA funde!!  businesses  in particular
industries  is almost  identical  to that of non-SBA  funded  small  businesses. A 1982  study  by
Armington  and Odle' also looks  at the employment  growth  of small  businesses  and determines
that small  businesses  generally  have larger shares  of slower-growing  industries  and appear to have
higher g.-awth  rates in regions  of the country  with overall  low  growth  rates. Small  businesses  also
generate a proportionate  share of jobs, not an unusually  high number  of jobs.  Similarly,  the
credit  market imperfections  argument  works  if good credit  risks  are being  denied credit.
However,  the high  default rates of SBA loans  suggests  that these firms  are in fact not good credit
risks. Gale's study  also shows  a limited  impact  on credit allocation,  in the order of a 25% larger
share of credit allocated  to small  businesses  due to SBA programs,  despite  a healthy  subsidy.
Tax-exemnt
The fifth  category  of government  credit involvement  has grown  rapidly  in recent years.
Little evidence  exists  on the credit allocation  effects  of tax-exempt  state and local financing.
These funds are used to finance  home mortgages,  industrial  development,  and student loans
prinarily. By Gale's analysis  this tax-exempt  group draws  8.3%  of the overall  credit  allocation
currently. Its share  would  be around 6.5% without  the tax subsidy.
Export  Financing
`;Catherine  Armington  and Marjorie  Odle, "Small  Business-How  Many  Jobs?"  Brookings
Review,  Winter 1982,  pp. 14-17.25
The information  on export financing,  the final  category,  is equally  inconclusive.  As shown
in Table 1,  the three export-oriented  programs,  Foreign  Military  Sales,  Export-Import  Bank,  and
P.L. 480 long  term export credits,  contribute  a substantial  share to 'he direct loans  by the U.S.
government. They comprise  29.5%  of the direct loans  and 13.9%  of the guaranteed  loans. The
loan guarantee  programs  include  the loans  by the Commodity  Credit  Corporation  in addition  to
the programs  mentioned  above. Periodically,  the U.S. Congress  holds hearings  on financing  for
the Export-Import  Bank. Various  advocates  hail the importance  of the Export-Import  Bank  in
generating  exports,  but no hard analysis  exists  of whether in fact ExIm  financing  generates  more
exports. Cursory  evidence  sheds some  doubt on this position. Throughout  the 1980's  U.S.
exports  have been rising. The value of exports  under ExIm  programs  has been falling,  resulting  in
a fall in the percentage  of U.S. exports  under ExIm  programs  from 8% in 1980  to around  2% in
1990.2 Furthermore,  a survey  by  the National  Association  of Manufacturers  in 1989  indicates
that lack  of export financing  ranks ninth in importance  among  factors  limiting  export growth  (out
of 12  factors).'
Similar  lack  of evidence  exists  for the other export programs,  such as the P.L. 480
Program. One explicit  aim of the program  is to expand  markets  for exports  of agricultural
commodities.  A recent study  cites  data showing  that 7 of the top 10 importers  of U.S farm
products  and 34 of the top 50 importers  received  P.L. 480  commodities.  However,  economists
from the Department  of Agriculture  have been unable to prove a causality  between the two."
Z Hearing  on Export-Import  Bank  Before  the Subcommittee  on International  Development,
Finance,  Trade and Monetary  Policy  of the Comnittee on Banking,  Finance and Urban  Affairs,
House of Representatives,  102  Congress,  1st Session,  April 11, 1991,  p. 157.
24Hearing  on ExIm Bank,  p. 219.
25  United  States General Accounting  Office,  Report to the Chairman,  Committee  on
Agriculture,  House of Representatives,  Food Aid: Improving  Economic  and Market
Development  Impact  in African  Countries  (Washington:  GAO/NSIAD-88-55,  December  1987).26
The benefit of this and the Commodity Credit Corporation programs to the U.S. is the support
for agricultural prices in the U.S. as well as for exports.  Since U.S. agricultural prices are in fact
higher than world prices, to a limited extent these programs have been successful.
V. Conclusion
The evidence presented sheds some doubt on the effectiveness of U.S. credit programs to
generate growth by increasing investment in targeted industriPs. However, since growth has never
been an explicit objective of the U.S. credit policies, this may not be surprising. As discussed in
Section m, there are four necessary conditions for directed credit to effectively stimulate growth.
The first condition is that credit must increase borrowing in the targeted sector.  Gale's work
focuses on testing this condition.  For the bulk of U.S. directed credit which goes toward the
housing market, this first condition will not be met if the cost of government borrowing to fund
the credit program raises interest rates, indicating  that a large part of the housing credit has gone
to inframarginal borrowers, people who would have borrowed anyway. However, as noted earlier,
the allocation of credit within the housing sector may be affected and cannot be captured by
Gale's simulation model.  For other targeted sectors, credit allocation has increased, but the
effects of each policy have been reduced by the existence of other programs.
The second condition, the link between credit and investment in the targeted sector, has
only been addressed in two sectors: agriculture and education.  In both cases, the studies indicate
weak links between credit and productive investment. The LeBlanc and Hrubovcak study show
greater increases in demand for a fixed asset, land, than for variable inputs in response to interest
rate changes. The education studies also show some increase in the number of students attending
college, but a significantly  smaller increase than the amount of credit advanced.  Thus, the27
efficiency  of the credit programs has not been high even if they have been effective in reaching
the targeted population.
The third condition linking credit and output in the targeted sector was discussed with
regard to agriculture and exports.  The paper by Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock reported a
significant  link in agriculture.  Exports, however, show no such linkage.
The final condition concerns the rate of growth in the targeted industry relative to the rest
of the economy. Evidence from small business studies suggests  that small businesses supported by
the SBA have not in fact grown faster than the rest of the economy.
Overall, none of the studies address all four conditions which must exist for directed credit
to be effective toward growth.  The scant evidence that does exist suggests that for most credit
programs at least one of the four conditions will not be satisfied. The conclusion, therefore, is
that the directed credit programs in the U.S. have not been particularly effective in stimulating
growth.  However, it should be noted that the goal of many of the programs in the U.S. was not
growth, but equity.  To the extent that marginal borrowers have received funds, some progress
toward equity has been achieved.26  Furthermore, in most cases, the credit programs have been
effective at increasing the credit allocated to the targeted group.  Thus, the directed credit
programs have been effective in changing the allocation of credit and perhaps in achieving  their
objective, which was generally removing market imperfections and enhancing equity, but not
'However,  note that the funds generally had to come from somewhere. Either other
nontargeted borrowers were squeezed out of the market for loans or an increase in interest rates
was able to attract more funds.  Further analysis  is necessary to determine whether the marginal
nontargeted borrowers losing access to funds are poorer than the marginal targeted borrowers
who gain access to funds.  Furthermore, those who hold government bonds or other interest-
bearing assets also gain at the margin from an increase in interest rates when the government
borrows to raise funds which would tend to adversely affect the distribution of income from an
equity standpoint.28
generally in generating growth.  The evidence cannot verify whether or not a growth oriented
credit program would have been successful.SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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